SD70ACe = 408,000 lbs F59PH = 260,000 lbs The correlates mostly to their difference in length, however. They are built with the same materials. Yes and no, and yes. What really matters is the relative strength of the part of the loco that's impacted, and how its impacted. including the engineering of various joints. And the speed of each train is equally important as the mass. (Force = mass x acceleration). I would speculate that the SD70 did less badly because it was going slower. Thus its deflection off the track would have happened sooner (less forward inertia). The UP crew also had the advantage that the frame of their loco sticks out a few feet in front of the cab, thus distancing them from the impact zone, as compared to the Metrolink engineer. The rest of the train behind the locomotive matters initially, but once a derailment has occurred and cars are accordioning, the effect at the front loco would be not much, and not very predictable. What was tragic was that the front of the first car of the Metrolink imploded onto the loco. Nobody in the front of that car had a chance. If the metrolink cars had deflected and accordioned, there might have been fewer fatalities, although there still would have been some. (At least 2 deaths were in the very rear car, from head trauma, even though it stayed on the tracks.)
NORAC rule #94-B was added after NJT's accident in 1993. It pertains to push-pull trains. The engineer must call signals( from approach & lower) to a qualified person(conductor or qualified brakeman) in the engine or train,if they are in non-CSS(cab signals) territory & maximum speed is over 30mph. This is done often on the Souther tier(Pt. Jervis) & was done from West End to the Bergen tunnels before CSS was added. . The conductor must take action if the engineer doesn't to slow or stop the train. Engineer must call a more favorable signal,before increasing speed. Also,it is the norm for a passenger engineer to be alone in the cab. Sometimes bosses,students & once in a blue moon,the conductor will be in the cab.
The UP was handling 80-some-odd cars. Most cars out of Oxnard are loads, so I imagine the train was 5-6,000 tons. The Metrolink train weighs somehwere around 4-500 tons. Imagine a foot stomping on an empty soda can... Still, very tragic event, my thoughts are with everyone involved.
Does from approach & lower mean approach + more restrictive aspects? If so, then if the engineer 'saw' a clear aspect (which was actually restrictive) he wouldn't call it. And presumably the conductor back down the train may not be looking out the window at that point to check the signals. But then again, doesn't the solo engineer on these trains get some sort of alarm when he gets near a non-clear signal? Not neccessarily full CSS but something like the UK systems that trigger a siren a few yards before a signal (which has to be acknowledged within a few seconds or the brakes get set).
1) Yes,more restrictive. 2) If a clear was after an approach,he'd still have to call it. Otherwise the conductor would assume the engineer forgot his last signal & put the train in emergency. 3) If cab signals are not in service,there is no alarm. There is nothing.
Seems to me you are a statistic waiting to happen, but I digress. This is a very sad, sad event. I have heard people who would know tell me to never ride in the forward bombardier cars of our local TRE trainsets just for the reason that played itself out here...cars telescoping over one another and the loco. Just a thought...could a "buffer car" help in this situation? I'm thinking of something resembling a shorty tank car (pill on wheels) that would still allow human access to/fro the loco and cars. This would ideally bounce the locos and cars away from each other during the collision to prevent the telescope effect. Obviously the cab-control car would be vision impaired if they were utilized on both ends...maybe the "cabbage" would have to be used on all trains in this case. The idea is similar to large PVC barrels they are putting around guardrails and exits these days to keep the cars from "can-opening" themselves on the guardrails. The barels "bend and deflect" with the idea that the alternative route (and avoiding have a long springy blade-like piece of galvenized steel pierce your passenger compartment and turning your car into a big blender) gives a better chance for survival when things go bad. ALSO, we had the crumple guards we used when I worked at TxDOT. Not sure if something like that could be incorporated as well but I'd have to think any little bit would help. Anyway, probably a crazy, bad, expensive idea but just grasping.
This article has a little more info, stating that a dispatcher received a warning that the Metrolink train had run a red signal: Metrolink dispatcher tried to warn engineer - Los Angeles Times
More Correct Info. Metro Wreck Confirmed: The freight train involved was UP's LOF65 "Leesdale Local" which runs roundtrip between Van Nuys (Gemco) and Oxnard in daylight hours M-F. The lead locomotive involved turned over on it's left conductor side is the UP8485, the trailing unit left upright is the UP8491. The Leesdale has just recently been converted to using more modern 2-year old EMD SD70ACes for locomotive power instead of the standard three EMD 6-axle Dash-2's that it's used for power over the last 10+ years. This little factor might have saved the UP crews lives (read on). The eastbound freight train or UP8485 East was traveling downgrade coming out of the short Tunnel #28 (which runs under Topanga Canyon Road) before collision with the passenger train. At impact it was about halfway through the somewhat tight 90ยบ Coastline mainline curve that turns due South through Chatsworth before turning back East towards Burbank. The Westbound Metrolink passenger train or Ventura Line Train #111 had left L.A. Union Passenger Terminal (LAUPT) at 3:35p and was scheduled to depart the Amtrak/Chatsworth Station at 4:16p (but was most likely running a little late). Per the norm for trains that have departed out of LAUPT, it had EMD F59PH locomotive SCAX855 leading first or in "pull mode" (the opposite direction "push" mode has the cabcar leading first and locomotive pushing backwards) with the standard Ventura Line three Bombardier-built commuter cars in tow. Reported time of the UP-SCAX head-on impact was 4:23p. ~~~ Speculation: As you an see from many of the photos, the force of the mostly loaded freight train upon head-on impact transferred into the lighter Metrolink train locomotive. These intense moving bodies forces as shown appear to have picked up the Metrolink locomotive off of it's front trucks (wheels), sheering off it's fuel tank in the process and pushed the F59PH backwards into the interior of the first passenger car. This telescoping effect is the most shocking part of the collision events - just picture being someone onboard the front car. At collision impact, passengers would have been flung forward while at the same time taking place in milliseconds the rear end of the heavy full width "cowl" locomotive carbody (containing full engine block, generators, radiators and other powerplant components) would be coming back at you as force pushed through the punctured front end of of the lead car. The full passenger car estimates of Metrolink #111 at normal scheduled capacity would be 75-120 passengers. Half of that passenger car rests tonight with a locomotive pushed through it's hollow core. Expect the passenger death toll to rise overnight. Although this accident may seem eerily similar to the failed Suicide SUV versus Metrolink train wreck in Glendale, CA from January 26, 2005, there are a few obvious differences in the details. Friday afternoon's Chatsworth wreck involved a moving train versus moving train head-on collision with much greater combined speed forces. Unlike the Glendale incident, the heavily damaged front commuter car from Metrolink train #111 is a "welded" body panel late phase design and not the early phase "bolted" panel design. The bolted panel design had been partially blamed for aiding in some passenger deaths in 2005 due to how the side carbody wall panels sheered apart. Unconfirmed reports on RR discussion board now state that the UP freight was lined into the CP Chatsworth siding with a "clear diverging" signal or low green light at West switch Chatsworth. This would support a few speculation theories based on the presented facts, impact location and specific timing of the head-on collision that the Metrolink engineer (who runs solo in the cab) ran past his red light shortly after departing the scheduled Chatsworth station stop. This would also mean running through a switch lined against his train's movement for the approaching freight. As noted, this human error theory is still pure speculation as it is WAY too early to rule out computer, signal or some other technical malfunction. We'll have to wait a few months (or years) for the NTSB to release their report.
Has anybody said why the UP train wasn't in the hole waiting for the Metrolink instead of the other way around. It is Metrolink, not UP, controlled track.
As far as any real infraction of a rule or law, I agree. However, I read a post elsewhere where the one kid who was supposedly texting, admitted so. And seemed to be hoping he could maintain some anonymity. Which simply isn't going to happen. If this is proven true, he'll be well known by name to the public. And will certainly be speaking with many investigators. Their cell records acquired, etc. In the end, when litigations start, I'd bet he will also be dragged into court. And even possibly subjected to attempts for assigning blame, as monetary damages are sought. Boxcab E50
OK, so I brought up Google Earth and Streets and Trips, and looked at this thing. I think I'm beginning to see why some of the locals and veterans are saying that 'something' had to have happened to the engineer. If I'm following this right, he had to have gone through the signal indication at the switch; and the switch itself, and then the block signal beyond the switch just before the curve. Wow. And the freight train was stopped...? so he had a red signal, or diverging clear? At this point I just hope they recover all the data, but yeah, I think that blaming this on a distracted engineer seems simplistic. Even if he was texting, running that switch on the north end of the Chatsworth siding, if it was set against him, would have got your attention REAL fast, and probably the attention of everybody in the train as well. I've been on trains through spring switches, and that scares the heck out of everybody. I have a great deal of respect for the NTSB, just wish it didn't take so long, because everybody will rush to judgement. There will be a lot more data. Thanks for posting that new article, that had what appeared to be some journalistic integrity in it.
Supposedly the UP train had a diverging approach meaning he was going in the hole at Chatsworth so he was moving, not stopped.
If that is true, that the UP freight had the switch lined and had a diverging clear (and they lived to tell what they saw, along with the evidence).... boy, do we need those black boxes and/or cameras. Other than that, its pure speculation. I can even see how it's possible to NOT look up at the signal, but blowing through the switch set against you? It wouldn't derail you, but the racket in the cab, you'd have to be somehow disabled not to hear that. That's the car equivalent of speed bumps, only louder. If there wasn't even so much as an emergency brake application at the end, well the data recorders will tell.
As I said, I met the kids, they didn't seem to be looking for Anonymity. They were excited to be on TV. They thought there comments were being taken out of context, but... Actually, I was rather disgusted by them. They were out at Fullerton railfanning acting like the most important part of the whole thing was that they were on TV. These were Teenagers. They knew this guy, supposedly texted him regularly yet they showed no remorse at the situation. They felt that the TV newsperson was misrepresenting the texting. They didn't realize the potential danger. They are either lying, or they're some emotionally messed up kids. Cause I can tell you, if someone I knew died like that and took people with him at a time I was communicating with him, I'd be an emotional wreck. And add on the fact that they didn't understand the danger the texts were posing... again, all assuming that isn't a lie.
That isn't what sp4009 (Joe Gartman, Locomotive Engineer, BNSF) said back about p4. He reckons you could easily not notice. Bear in mind that trailing through a closed power/manual turnout will likely damage it and the blades will stay where they've been forced to. A spring switch will snap back behind each wheel or truck with a bang, unless it has a damper. Drivers failing to see, interpret or react to signals is not an unusual event in the world. In the UK it runs to 100's each year (http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/server/show/nav.1137) though only about 20 are considered high risk. Although we are interested in trains, driving one all day every day up and down the same bit of track, as commuter train engineers do, has got to lose it's shine. "My head aches ... this signal is always clear ... wonder what's for dinner ... oh, cr**". Hands up all who can swear nothing like that ever happened to them while driving (just substitute "nothing is ever parked round this bend" for the signal bit). If it was an error by the Metro engineer, it isn't that remarkable and it doesn't make him a bad person. We all make mistakes. I'm more surprised that passenger trains are run single operator up front with no backup systems. Statictically this sort of incident is almost certain to have happened sometime. Luckily it wasn't another Metro coming the other way.
" Cell phone distraction! BS! I have made thousands of meets while talking on the radio, resetting relays, making coffee, digging in my grip. Hell, I have even been playing classical guitar making a meet. I just don't buy this cell phone distraction. It makes a great news story. Right? And some rail fans get a lot of attention. Trust me, I have worked a lot of railroad divisions as an engineer, Bakersfield to LA, Bakersfield to West Colton, West Colton to Yuma, all over the LA Basin, Tucson to Yuma, Tucson to El Paso. My I say, Marty Robins can have El Paso. I have even worked over the Santa Fe from Mojave to Barstow, Barstow to San Bernardino once. Pointy being, I have made a lot of meets over the years, been distracted, self induced many times, and NEVER gone through a red block signal, must less an A-Signal (control signal). You guys that are engineers out there, just think about what I have said. Do you smell a rat? " I don't know if its a RAT I smell, but I would say maybe you should pay a little more attention to your job during train meets? At least if it happens to you WE will know who to blame because you have admitted to the World your not paying attention. If you think you a old head and it can't happen to you....Those are famous last words my friend....
Just saw this on the local news wire - a 26th life was lost Death toll rises to 26 in LA train collision
I'd like to put a few items together, for consideration: 1. The Metrolink train had a 2-person crew: an engineer up front, and 1 conductor who was located somewhere among the passengers. 2. The Metrolink train had just gone through the "Chatsworth Station". (see post #69). I am assuming it stopped there to drop off passengers. Perhaps some passengers also boarded there? Would the (sole) conductor then have to check the tickets for any passengers who boarded at Chatsworth? 3. Factor in that it is common for some passenger who is unfamiliar with the train line to be asking a conductor about when their stop will be, asking about connecting service, asking how late the train is, etc. 4. Per SecretWeapon's post #62, the conductor was supposed to be on the radio with the engineer, listening to him verbalize the signal settings, and repeating those back to the engineer on the radio. (I'm not sure if the conductor was also supposed to be looking out the window at the signals to verify their settings). I'm have a hard time seeing how a sole conductor could balance all of these demands every single day, at this point in the line. I'm not any kind of expert on this, but it just seems to me that an awful lot is being expected of this sole conductor, in this scenario, on an everyday basis. Maybe someone who knows the score better than I do can offer some thoughts on this?
Hey, In addition to the conductor,there is a rear brakeman. Being this was a rush hour train,there could've been at least 1 ticket collector,maybe 2. That's the way its done on NJT,anyway. No the conductor is not required to look out the window for a signal. Its all done over the radio.
