ChrisDante
April 6th, 2000, 02:12 PM
A friend passed this on to me and I thought I would share it with you.
In the recently released Market Based Network Analysis prepared
by Amtrak
for Congress, Amtrak analyzed each train (or train service/route)
for that
individual train's contribution to the bottom line. In other
words, a
calculation was made of how much net income Amtrak would lose (or
gain) if
that train were removed from the network of trains that Amtrak
operates.
Since for this analysis it was assumed that certain fixed costs
would
continue even though a particular train were eliminated, those
continuing
fixed costs were not allocated to the individual trains, and thus
the
numbers in the "contribution" analysis are not the same as in
Amtrak's
Route Profitability System (RPS) analysis (where all costs are
allocated
proportionally to each train).
The "contribution" is the total revenue for operating a route
less
variable and attributable fixed and overhead costs. It does not
include fixed and
overhead costs that can not be attributed to a particular route,
and which
would continue even if that route were eliminated.
Note that revenue does include "institutional support" and
"business
partnerships"; in other words, funds provided by states or other
entities
in support of train operations (but not federal subsidies).
Here is how much each train/route/service is expected to
contribute to the
bottom line in FY 2002 ($ million). The list is sorted starting
the
greatest contribution down to the route that has the greatest
negative
contribution. The routes/trains listed are as they are expected
to exist in FY 2002.
Acela Express 344.91 million dollars
Acela Regional (NE Direct) 189.06
SW Chief 32.18
Auto Train 29.27
Empire Service 16.68
San Diegans 15.44
San Joaquins 13.47
Cal. Zephyr 11.93
Carolinian 10.47
Transcontinental 10.38
Lake Shore Ltd. 10.06
Cascades 9.30
Silver Meteor 8.80
Crescent 8.08
KC-St Louis 6.81
Hiawatha 6.25
Acela Regional (Keystone) 6.12
Empire Builder 5.90
Capitols 5.84
Acela Commuter (Clockers) 4.80
Heartland Flyer 3.97
Twilight Ltd. 3.95
Vermonter 2.68
Silver Star 2.58
Coast Starlight 2.57
International 2.11
Illini 2.07
Manhattan Ltd. 1.91
St. Louis-Chicago 1.74
Silver Palm 1.69
Las Vegas-LA 1.65
Piedmont 1.51
Illinois Zephyr 1.17
Aztec Eagle 0.55
Pere Marquette 0.20
Adirondack 0.07
SF-Monterey 0.00
KY Cardinal -0.02
City of New Orleans -0.62
Fond du Lac-Chicago -0.65
Ethan Allen -0.80
Janesville-Chicago -1.24
Three Rivers -1.82
Des Moines-Chicago -1.84
Pontiac-Detroit-Chicago -1.89
Capitol Ltd. -2.10
Maine Service -2.86
Toledo-Dearborn-Chicago -3.09
Sunset Ltd. -3.76
Pennsylvanian -3.81
Cardinal -3.82
Texas Eagle -6.62
In the analysis, Amtrak looked at the effect of eliminating each
of the
trains that show a negative contribution on the overall bottom
line of the
full network of trains. In every case save one, elimination of
the train
caused a DROP in revenues on other trains greater than the loss
of
generated directly by the train in question. In other words,
because of the network
effect, eliminating the "losing" train causes a greater loss to
other trains
than the amount directly saved by eliminating the train, because
those
trains serve as "feeders" to the rest of the network.
The one exception was the "Maine Service." Because this train is
isolated
from the rest of the system (the lack of a rail connection in
Boston
between the South and North Stations precludes the exchange of
mail and express
and discourages through passengers), eliminating the Maine
Service train would
improve the bottom line by the amount it loses: $2.86 million in
FY 2002.
However, the contract for the Maine Service stipulates that
institutional
support (in the report, "institutional support" seems to be a way
of
saying "state subsidy") will ensure that Amtrak will breakeven
after three years.
------------------
When in doubt, empty your magazine.
In the recently released Market Based Network Analysis prepared
by Amtrak
for Congress, Amtrak analyzed each train (or train service/route)
for that
individual train's contribution to the bottom line. In other
words, a
calculation was made of how much net income Amtrak would lose (or
gain) if
that train were removed from the network of trains that Amtrak
operates.
Since for this analysis it was assumed that certain fixed costs
would
continue even though a particular train were eliminated, those
continuing
fixed costs were not allocated to the individual trains, and thus
the
numbers in the "contribution" analysis are not the same as in
Amtrak's
Route Profitability System (RPS) analysis (where all costs are
allocated
proportionally to each train).
The "contribution" is the total revenue for operating a route
less
variable and attributable fixed and overhead costs. It does not
include fixed and
overhead costs that can not be attributed to a particular route,
and which
would continue even if that route were eliminated.
Note that revenue does include "institutional support" and
"business
partnerships"; in other words, funds provided by states or other
entities
in support of train operations (but not federal subsidies).
Here is how much each train/route/service is expected to
contribute to the
bottom line in FY 2002 ($ million). The list is sorted starting
the
greatest contribution down to the route that has the greatest
negative
contribution. The routes/trains listed are as they are expected
to exist in FY 2002.
Acela Express 344.91 million dollars
Acela Regional (NE Direct) 189.06
SW Chief 32.18
Auto Train 29.27
Empire Service 16.68
San Diegans 15.44
San Joaquins 13.47
Cal. Zephyr 11.93
Carolinian 10.47
Transcontinental 10.38
Lake Shore Ltd. 10.06
Cascades 9.30
Silver Meteor 8.80
Crescent 8.08
KC-St Louis 6.81
Hiawatha 6.25
Acela Regional (Keystone) 6.12
Empire Builder 5.90
Capitols 5.84
Acela Commuter (Clockers) 4.80
Heartland Flyer 3.97
Twilight Ltd. 3.95
Vermonter 2.68
Silver Star 2.58
Coast Starlight 2.57
International 2.11
Illini 2.07
Manhattan Ltd. 1.91
St. Louis-Chicago 1.74
Silver Palm 1.69
Las Vegas-LA 1.65
Piedmont 1.51
Illinois Zephyr 1.17
Aztec Eagle 0.55
Pere Marquette 0.20
Adirondack 0.07
SF-Monterey 0.00
KY Cardinal -0.02
City of New Orleans -0.62
Fond du Lac-Chicago -0.65
Ethan Allen -0.80
Janesville-Chicago -1.24
Three Rivers -1.82
Des Moines-Chicago -1.84
Pontiac-Detroit-Chicago -1.89
Capitol Ltd. -2.10
Maine Service -2.86
Toledo-Dearborn-Chicago -3.09
Sunset Ltd. -3.76
Pennsylvanian -3.81
Cardinal -3.82
Texas Eagle -6.62
In the analysis, Amtrak looked at the effect of eliminating each
of the
trains that show a negative contribution on the overall bottom
line of the
full network of trains. In every case save one, elimination of
the train
caused a DROP in revenues on other trains greater than the loss
of
generated directly by the train in question. In other words,
because of the network
effect, eliminating the "losing" train causes a greater loss to
other trains
than the amount directly saved by eliminating the train, because
those
trains serve as "feeders" to the rest of the network.
The one exception was the "Maine Service." Because this train is
isolated
from the rest of the system (the lack of a rail connection in
Boston
between the South and North Stations precludes the exchange of
mail and express
and discourages through passengers), eliminating the Maine
Service train would
improve the bottom line by the amount it loses: $2.86 million in
FY 2002.
However, the contract for the Maine Service stipulates that
institutional
support (in the report, "institutional support" seems to be a way
of
saying "state subsidy") will ensure that Amtrak will breakeven
after three years.
------------------
When in doubt, empty your magazine.